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RECENT DECISIONS
ARBITRATION-PENALTY-PROVISION IN ARBITRATION CLAUSE AUTHORIZING ARniTRATORS To IMPOSE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF CONTRACT-A collective bargaining

agreement provided for an award of damages, money or other penalties if the agreement were violated. The arbitrators, upon finding that the defendant union violated
a no-strike provision, awarded $2,000 actual damages and provided that, if the union
again violated the agreement, a penalty or punitive damages in the amount of $5,000
would be payable at the option of the party aggrieved. Special Term granted a motion
by the petitioner for an order confirming the arbitrators' award and denied a cross
motion by the defendant to vacate certain paragraphs of the award and gave judgment
to petitioner. Upon appeal, two justices dissenting, held, order modified by reversing
so much thereof as confirms the award of $5,000 punitive damages. Publishers' Ass'n
of New York City et al. v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 280 App, Div. 500,
114 N. Y. S. 2d 401 (1st Dep't 1952).
The two issues in the instant case requiring consideration are whether the contract
provisions for and the award of punitive damages should be refused enforcement by
the courts, and secondly, whether the award is sufficiently mutual, final and definite
to justify enforcement by judgment.'
The duty of the court in respect to confirming and enforcing arbitrators' awards is
prescribed by statute2 and the legislature of the state has determined the validity of a
contract to arbitrate except as to certain instances not relevant here8 It is directed
that the courts must grant and enforce an award 4 unless it is vacated upon certain
grounds of illegality specifically enumerated in the statute 5 No ground of excessive
or improper damage is specified as a basis for vacating an award.( Admittedly a
confiscatory or penal award so oppressive as to be violative of basic public policy
could not be conscionably enforced by the courts. 7 It appears, however, that in fact
the award in the instant case is not confiscatory. 8
In the past, New York decisions0 have appeared uniformly to hold that an award
1. "In either of the following cases, the court must make an order vacating the award
upon the application of any party to the controversy which was arbitrated:-4. Where the
arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and
definite award upon the subject-matter submitted was not made." N. Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT
§ 1462(4).
2. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT §§ 1448-69.
3. N. Y. Civ. PRc. AcT § 1448.
4.

N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 1461.

5. Fraud, corruption, partiality, or where the arbitrators have been guilty of prejudicial
misconduct or if the submission was not valid. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 1462.
6. Ibid.
7. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. American Communications Ass'n, 299 N.Y. 177, 86
N. E. 2d 162 (1949). See Kingswood Management Corp. v. Salzman, 272 App. Div. 328,
70 N.Y.S. 2d 692 (Ist Dep't 1947).
8. In East India Trading Co. v. Halari, 280 App. Div. 420, 114 N. Y. S. 2d 93 (1st Dep't
1952), the court enforced an award determined by an arbitrator in accordance with a trade
association's rules which included a bonus of $436.80 not covered by actual damages. The
court in the instant case asserts that its opinion is not at variance with the holding of that
case (decided the same day) since it was found as a fact that no "penalty" was Imposed.
The suggestion of the dissent that the problem of oppressive awards be dealt with when
squarely before the court and not be determined in the instant case appears meritorious.
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of arbitrators can not be set aside for mere errors of judgment either as to the law
or as to the facts. In the leading New York case of Fudickar v. The Guardian Mutual

Life Ins. Co.,10 the plaintiff was employed by defendant as superintendent of de-

fendant's agencies. Plaintiff agreed to render services as an insurance salesman and
by his contract was to receive a percentage on premiums collected, which was to
continue after the contract should cease to be in force. Plaintiff was also to receive
renewal premiums on policies obtained through his agency, including renewal commissions to which he was entitled under a former contract, which was, in other respects
revoked. Defendant dismissed the plaintiff for misconduct and their arbitrators upheld
the dismissal and cancelled future commissions or any sum in lieu of renewal commissions due to the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals of New York upheld the arbitrators'
decision, citing the general principle that the decision of an arbitrator in a matter
within his jurisdiction is final and conclusive between the parties." In Matter of
3Mencher,'2 the court, citing the Fudickar case, held that all reasonable intendments
and presumptions are indulged in support of awards. In Matter of Wilki$, 13 the
questions of law involved related to a submission and award determining the rights of
the parties under certain leases of property, which included the interpretation or
construction of the leases and a determination of the legal rights of the parties under
them. The appellant excepted to the award and to each conclusion thereof but no
motion was made to vacate, modify or correct the award upon any of the grounds
mentioned in the statute. Relying upon the Fudickar case the court held that if the
arbitrator acts within his jurisdiction and is not guilty of fraud, corruption or other
misconduct his award is unassailable.
In vacating part of the award the decision of the court herein is based upon the rule
that punitive damages are not allowed for breach of contract.' 4 It is argued that the
court may not enforce the penalty provision, because it would not allow or enforce
such provision in an action at law for breach of the contract maintained before the
court directly.
9. Jacobowitz et al. v. Herson et al., 268 N. Y. 130, 197 N. E. 169 (1935); Wheat
Export Co., Inc. v. The New Century Co., 185 App. Div. 723, 173 N.Y. Supp. 679
(1st Dep't), af'd, 227 N.Y. 595, 125 N.E. 926 (1919); Matter of Burke et al., 191 N.Y.
437, 84 N.E. 405 (1908); Friedheim v. International Paper Co., 265 App. Div. 601,
40 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1st Dep't 1943); D. Goff and Sons, Inc. v. Rheinauer, 199 App.
Div. 617, 192 N.Y. Supp. 92 (1st Dep't 1922); Silver Refrigerator Mfg. Corp. v.
CIementi, 99 N.Y.S. 2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Government of Kingdom of Netherlands
v. American Armament Corp, 58 N.Y.S. 2d 300 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
10. 62 N.Y. 392 (1875).
11. Id. at 399. As the basis for its decision the court cited Perkins v. Giles et al.,
50 N.Y. 228 (1872), which held that where no charge of corruption or bad faith of
the arbitrators is made, mere errors of judgment are no grounds for setting aside an
award, and neither party will be allowed to prove for that purpose that the arbitrators
erred as to the law or the facts.
12. 276 App. Div. 556, 96 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1st Dep't 1950).
494, 62 N.E. 575 (1902).
13. 169 'N.Y.
14. REsTATEarENT, CONEAcTs § 342 (1932). Even this rule has had an exception in
damages for certain non-pecuniary suffering such as loss of social position, humiliation
and nervous illness caused by breach of promise to marry when such action was maintainable. Chellis v. Chapman, 125 N.Y. 214, 26 N.E. 308 (1891); Johnson v. Jenkins, 24
N.Y. 252 (1862). See also Pullman Co. v. Lutz, 154 Ala. 517, 45 So. 675 (1903), where
in actions against public service companies, for breach of duty which, though imposed
by law, is enforced in an action of contract, exemplary damages are often allowed.
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However, the instant case is concerned with an award in arbitration to which the
legal rules of damage have no application. Arbitrators are not bound to recognize the
distinction made by the courts as to the damages properly awarded in actions in
contract as distinguished from those in tort. The rules limiting damages in civil actions
grow out of judicial interpretation and arbitrators are bound by no rule of stare decisis.
In arbitration the interpretation of the law as well as the facts is for the arbitrators
and they are limited solely by the extent of their jurisdiction under the submission
or agreement to arbitrate. 15
As to the second question concerning the finality, definiteness and mutuality of the
award, the court held that to make operative the $5,000 punitive part of the award,
three additional events, each uncertain and unpredictable, must conjoin at some
definite future time and therefore the award is judicially unenforceable. 10 The minority
opinion argues, and it it submitted validly, that the award is enforceable, since it
specifically states the conditions under which the $5,000 becomes payable. There is
nothing more for the arbitrators to do1 7 except to say that there has been a recurrence
of a strike in violation of the contract. Thus the strike that has already occurred
defines the event, the recurrence of which makes the penalty payable and further
litigation would be unnecessary in order to adjust the matter submitted.
It would appear that neither the contractual provision nor the awarded penalty of
$5,000 imposed tentatively as a deterrent against future violations of the collective
bargaining agreement conflict with the laws of this state. The dubiousness with which,
at one time, courts regarded the withdrawal of controversies from their jurisdiction
by the agreement of parties, has yielded to a more sensible view, and arbitrators are
now encouraged as an easy, expeditious and inexpensive method of settling disputes,
and as tending to prevent litigation.18 The arbitrator is in effect a judge appointed by
the parties; he is with their consent invested with judicial functions in the particular
case; he is to determine the rights as between the parties in respect to the matter
submitted; and all questions of fact or law upon which the rights depend may be
referred to him for decision under a general submission or agreement. 19 If courts
15. In Everett v. Brown et al., 120 Misc. 349, 198 N.Y. Supp. 462 (Sup. Ct. 1923),
the court took the view that while an arbitration partakes of the nature of a quasi-

judicial proceeding it is not such in a technical sense, and to require an arbitrator to
follow the fixed rules of law in arriving at an award would operate to defeat the object

of an arbitration.
16. The court referred to these contingencies: (a) there must be a, new violation

of the contract by the union; (b) there must be a finding of a new violation by the
adjustment board; and (c) the aggrieved party must exercise an option to make the
punitive damages effective.
17. An award must be such a disposition of the matters submitted that nothing
further remains to fix the rights and obligations of the parties, that the party against

whom it is made can perform or pay it without further ascertainment of rights or
duties. See Hicks et al. v. Magoun et al., 38 App. Div. 573, 578, 56 N.Y. Supp. 484,
488 (2d Dep't 1899), af'd mem., 167 N.Y. 540, 60 N.E. 1112 (1901).
18. This rationale was set forth where a decision in which a third arbitrator participated was held binding, although one of the parties did not specifically authorize him to

be called. It was the trade custom that the arbitrators selected had power to select a
third arbitrator when the two original arbitrators could not reach an agreement. See
Welsh et al. v. Probst et al., 151 App. Div. 147, 135 N.Y. Supp. 642 (4th Dep't 1912).
19. Cf. Sweet et a!. v. Morrision et al., 116 N.Y. 19, 22 N.E. 276 (1889) (where a
chief engineer was made an umpire to decide all matters arising or growing out of

RECENT DECISIONS
should now assume to rejudge the decisions of arbitrators upon the merits, the value
of this method of settling controversies would be destroyed, and an award instead of
beng a final determination of a controversy would now become but one of the steps
in its progress. 2 0

OF SECTION 51-A OF CIVIL PRAtCTICE
EQUITY-INTERPLEADER-CONSTRUCTION
AcT.Plaintiff, as assignee of the British Treasury, brought an action against the
defendant bank for an amount deposited with the defendant by a British National
The depositor had not complied with the provisions of the British Exchange Control
Act which required her to exchange her dollars for pounds sterling or suffer a forfeiture to the British government. The depositor was not made a party to the
action. Defendant bank obtained leave of the Supreme Court to notify the depositor
of the pendency of the action by complying with section 51-A of the New York
Civil Practice Act, permitting the depositor to intervene within one year. No appearance by the depositor was made. The defendant then served its answer setting
up various defenses and alleging that the failure of the depositor to join in the
action precluded the plaintiff's recovery. The plaintiff moved to strike out the defendant's answer on the ground that the running of the statute had barred the
depositor's claim and she was no longer an adverse party. The court at Special
Term denied the plaintiff's motion. The Appellate Division, one justice dissenting,
affirmed. On appeal, one judge dissenting, held, affirmed. Defendant was entitled to
put plaintiff to his proof. The depositor, though barred in this jurisdiction, remained
an adverse party since she could pursue her remedy in another jurisdiction. His
Majesty's Treasury v. Bankers Trust Co., 304 N. Y. 282, 107 N. E. 2d 448 (1952).
The instant case is one of first impression in the New York courts. The problem of jurisdiction involved arises under section 51-A of the New York Civil Practice Act,' which is applicable to interpleader actions. Under the leading case of

the contract. Said chief engineer gave his certificate and final estimate as stipulated
and the court, citing Perkins v. Giles et a., 50 N. Y. 228 (1872) and Fudickar v. The
Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co., 62 N.Y. 392 (1875), upheld his estimate even though
the chief engineer did not personally measure or superintend the measurements, but relied
on the reports of his subordinates). The conclusiveness of awards is based upon the
principle that the parties having chosen judges of their own and agreed to abide by their
decision are bound by their agreement and compelled to perform the award.
20. Cf. Itoh & Co., Ltd. v. Boyer Oil Co., 198 App. Div. 881, 191 N.Y. Supp. 290
(1st Dep't 1921), where a contract of sale stipulated that "any dispute arising out of this
contract" should be arbitrated. The court held that the arbitrators appointed thereunder
had the power to determine any dispute as to the construction of the contract and they
did not exceed their powers by adopting a construction differing from that claimed by
the buyer. Arbitration, the court stated, is intended to be a short cut to substantial
justice between the parties and an award should not be impeached except upon substantial
grounds and for the reasons specified in the law.
1. "Action to be commenced within one year after notice. 1: No action for the
recovery of any sum of money due and payable under or on account of a contract, or
for any part thereof, shall be commenced by any person who has made claim to said sum,
after the expiration of one year from the giving of notice, as hereinafter provided, to the said
claimant that an action commenced by another person is pending to recover said sum or
any part thereof exceeding fifty dollars in amount. . . ." N.Y. Civ. PnAc. ACT § 51-A.
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Pennoyer v. Neff,2 in order to make a binding adjudication the court must either
have jurisdiction over some property in the action, i.e., in rem, or jurisdiction of the
person, i.e., in personam. In the instant case there is no claim made that the court
has jurisdiction over the person of the depositor. It is necessary therefore that
there be in rem jurisdiction. Usually a deposit of property with the court or an
attachment of property before the action is commenced 3 will give the court in rem
jurisdiction. The equitable remedy of interpleader is, as are most equitable forms
of action, in personam in nature. However, by statute a certain amount of in rem
jurisdiction exists in the courts of New York. The subject matter in issue, however,
must be specific personal property. 4 If the debt being claimed in an action is evidenced by a negotiable instrument there is a "specific res" and it may be the basis
of an in rem action. 5 Whenever there is a specific res there is a full and adequate
remedy supplied to the stakeholder under the Civil Practice Act. The court will
adjudicate the rights of the claimants to the property and will discharge the stakeholder from further liability.
The problem here is, whether a debt or claim for a sum of money only, is a
sufficient res to give the court in rem jurisdiction. Some courts have held it to be
so. In Feucktenwanger v. Central Bank and Trust Co.,( a bank account was held tb
be a specific res sufficient to support a service by publication 7 on a non-resident
party and to give in rem jurisdiction. Also the court in Morgan v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co.8 held a debt in the form of an insurance policy to be specific personal property.
However, neither of these cases involved interpleader. Contra to these holdings
are several cases directly involving interpleader in which a debt or bank deposit was
squarely held to be incapable of supporting an in rem action. The earliest such
decision was Cross v. Armstrong,0 where a money claim based on an insurance policy
was involved and it was held to be an intangible res. In accord with that case,
and the leading case on the question, is Hanna v. Stedman.10 That case involved an
action of interpleader brought by an insurance company to which conflicting claims
had been made for monies due and payable under a life insurance policy. One of
the claimants was a non-resident and was served with summons and complaint by
publication. Relying upon a decision of the United States Supreme Court in New
York Life Insurance Co. v. Dunlevy n the Court of Appeals held that interpleader
is essentially an in personam action and that a debt is not a res which serves as a
constitutional basis to empower a court to adjudicate a creditor's rights in an action
in rem.
In 1939 to alleviate the existing situation12 the legislature added section 51-A to
2. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
3. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 232.
4. N.Y. Civ. PRac. ACT § 287-a.
5. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 287-d.
6. 288 N.Y. 342, 43 N.E. 2d 434 (1942).
7. Under N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 232 (2).
8. 189 N.Y. 447, 82 N.E. 438 (1907).
9. 44 Ohio St. 613, 10 N.E. 160 (1887).
10. 230 N.Y. 326, 130 N.E. 566 (1921).
11. 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
12. In 1939 numerous interpleader cases arose due to the many confiscations of property by foreign nations of their citizen's bank accounts deposited in New York banks.
Both the foreign government and the depositor claimed these accounts. The stakeholder
banks were constantly under the threat of a hazard of double recovery.

1953]

RECENT DECISIONS

the Civil Practice Act. This section was enacted in the hope that it would give
relief in the one situation where all other remedies had failed, i.e., where there was
a claim for a sum of money only and non-resident claimants.
The procedure as set forth in section 51-A was followed in the instant case. However, the court held, that although the non-resident claimant was barred from bringing an action to recover the funds in New York, she was not barred from so doing
in any other state where jurisdiction could be had over the stakeholder-creditor
bank.' Hence, the procedure under section 51-A was of no practical value to the
stakeholder herein since it is still under a hazard of a double recovery. It seems
apparent, therefore, that the statute has failed to accomplish its stated purpose,
namely, protection for a stakeholder of a money debt against non-resident claimants.
The court in the instant decision has held that section 51-A is a short statute of
limitations' 4 applicable to interpleader actions and it is not pretended to be anything more. Thus as a statute of limitations it has no extraterritorial effect.' 0
The stakeholder has no remedy by proceeding under sections 232 and 232-A of the
Civil Practice Act which allow service by publication on a non-resident since these

sections are not applicable unless there is a specific res with a New York situs. It
has been held by the United States Supreme Court that a debt in interpleader does
not have its situs where the debtor resides nor does the depositing of it in court
give the court any jurisdiction in rem. 16 Attachment statutes such as sections 232
and 902 of the Civil Practice Act offer no remedy since in order to be subject to
attachment the subject matter must belong to a non-resident debtor.

A more complete remedy may be had under the Federal Interpleader Statutes
where an adjudication would be binding throughout the country. However, these
7
are not applicable here in view of the foreign claimant.'
Thus under the facts of the instant case there is no possible remedy afforded

by the existing laws from the ever impending threat of double recovery, if the
stakeholder should be sued by the non-resident claimant in another jurisdiction.

The decision points out an urgent need for revision of New York interpleader
remedies.

TAxATioN-INcom:E TAXES-LEGAL FEES INcumrRE

IN DEFICIENcy REDvTPnnNA-

TioN NoN-DEaucrE.7-Petitioner in 1940 made a gift of a number of shares of

stock in a family corporation and filed the required gift tax return that year. In 1944
the Commissioner revalued the stock and notified petitioner of a deficiency. Through
his attorney petitioner sought a redetermination of the deficiency, forestalled an assessment, and effected a settlement at a figure substantially less than that demanded by
13. Relief under Section 51-A will be sufficient in those states which will recognize
our Statute of Limitations under their borrowing statutes.
14. See also Koninklijke Lederfabriek v. Chase Nat. Bank, 177 Misc. 186, 30 N.Y.S.
2d 518 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
15. Goodrich v. Rochester Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 173 App. Div. 577, 160 N.Y.
Supp. 454 (4th Dep't 1916) (concededly a statute of limitations is usually a procedural
statute and thus in resolving the conflict of laws the law of the forum will control). See
Townsend v. Jemison, 9 How. 406 (U.S. 1850).
16. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
17. (1) The claim must be over $500; (2) there may not be foreign claimants; (3) there
must be diversity of citizenship. 49 STAr. 1096, 28 U.S. C.A. § 1335 (1936).
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the Commissioner. In his 1946 return the petitioner claimed a refund on his 1944
taxes on the ground that the attorney's fees incurred in the 1944 suit should have
been deducted from his gross income for that year. The Commissioner refused to
allow the refund whereupon petitioner instituted this suit. The district court held as
a matter of law that the fees were deductible and the court of appeals reversed. Upon
appeal to the United States Supreme Court, three justices dissenting, held, judgment
of the court of appeals affirmed. The expense of counsel was not proximately related
to the production or collection of income or to the management, conservation or
maintenance of property held for the production of income as required by Section 23
(a) (2). Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118 (1952).
Prior to 1942 the deduction available to the individual under Section 23 of the
Internal Revenue Code were limited to "ordinary or necessary expenses incurred
during the taxable year in carrying on a trade or business."' As a result of Higgins v.
Commissioner,2 where expenses incurred by an individual in the management of income
producing securities were held not to be deductible because they were not trade or
business expenses, Congress added the provision under which the present deduction is
sought. The purpose of the amendment was not to make all family or personal
expenses deductible but to allow a deduction for ordinary and necessary expenses
incurred during the taxable year for (a) the production or collection of income, or
(b) the management, conservation or maintenance of property held for the production
of income.3
The applicability of the foregoing section to legal fees incurred and paid by the
taxpayer has been the subject of extended litigation. In the case of Bingham's Trust
v. Commissioner,4 legal fees, expended partly in contesting an income tax deficiency
and partly in terminating a trust under the trust agreement, were held to be deductible.
The Court in allowing these deductions reasoned that the fees were an integral part
of the management of the trust property held for the production of income. Citing
and following Bingham's Trust, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Williams v. McGowan5 held that legal fees paid to secure a refund on taxes previously
paid on an erroneous determination concerning losses on certain lease holdings were
deductible under the instant section. The court noted that although the Bingham case
involved a trust it "was not a controlling consideration" O and "nothing turned upon
the circumstance." 7 Caminack v. Commissioner,8 a case decided soon after the
Bingham case, held that fees incurred in obtaining a refund on a claim of loss resulting
from investment in securities of a corporation which failed were deductible as nonbusiness expenses incurred in the management of property held for the production of
income.9 This holding is now generally accepted.' 0 From" an analysis of the cases
it would seem that to be deductible the expenses must bear a reasonable and proximate
1. 53 STAT. 12, 26 U.S.C. 23 (a) (1) A (1939).
2. 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
3. 56 STAT. 819, 26 U.S.C. 23 (a) (1) (C) (2) (1942).
4. 325 U.S. 365 (1945).
5.

152 F. 2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945).

6. Id. at 571.
7. Ibid.
8. 5 T.C. 467 (1945).
9. This was so notwithstanding the fact that the taxpayers had ceased to regard the
property as productive of income and had claimed it as a loss.
10. Heyman et al. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 799 (1946); Connelly v. Commissioner, 6
T.C. 744 (1946).
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relation to the production and collection of income and/or to the maintenance of
income producing property."
In Cobb v. Conmissioner,'2 the first adjudication of the instant problem by an
appellate court, the taxpayer made a gift to his children of certain real property
interests for the purpose of lowering his income. Upon review of the petitioner's gift
tax return, the Commissioner determined a deficiency which the taxpayer contested
thereby expending legal fees. The court denied the right of the taxpayer to deduct
such fees and held: "The true criterion would seem to be that, to become deductible
under the statute, the expense must be in proximate relation to the production or
collection of income or to the care and conservation of property held to produce it.
The paring of the deficiency in the taxpayer's gift tax through the efforts of his
attorneys was beneficial to him, in that he was not forced to sell other incomeproducing property, but the expense to that end is not appropriately classifiable as an
expense in conserving such property." 13 Neither gifts in their ordinary sense nor the
expenses incurred in making them are regarded as productive of income.' 4
The ordinary and necessary character of the legal expenses incurred in the principal
case was not questioned but the Court indicated that they must depend for their
deductibility on the nature of the activities to which they relate. The Court refused
to treat the transfer of stock or the attorney's fee as incidents of management within
the scope of the statute and took the position that the attorney's fee expended in
making the gift was not proximately related to the production of income.
The decision in the instant case appears sound. The argument of the dissent that
the substantial saving effected through the efforts of the attorney constituted maintenance of property held for the production of income is not convincing. That the
petitioner has saved money and property can not be doubted but it is submitted that
such savings flow not proximately but incidentally from the expense claimed. To hold
otherwise would be to allow legal fees in almost every type of defended action. As to
the further contention of the dissent that the casual argument, if carried to its extremes, would lead to absurdities one needs but point to the multifarious problems of
causation in the field of torts which have yielded to the judicial process tempered by
3
a little common sense.'
11. The treasury regulation interpreting Section 23 (a) (2) reads as follows: "Expenses
paid or incurred by an individual in determining or contesting any liability asserted against
him does not become deductible, however, by reason of the fact that property held by him
for the production of income may be required to be used or sold for the purpose of satisfying
the liability. Thus, expenses paid or incurred by an individual in the determination of
gift tax liability, except to the extent such expenses are allocable to interest of a refund
of gift taxes, are not deductible, even though property held by him for the production
of income must be sold.to satisfy an assessment for such tax liability or even though, in the
event of a claim for refund, the amount recovered will be held for the production of
income." U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23 (a)-15 (b).
12. 173 F. 2d 711 (6th Cir. 1949).
13. Id. at 714.
14. In the principal case petitioner sought to distinguish the Cobb case alleging that the
gift herein was part of a general plan to produce income for himself by fostering family
management through ownership by the donee of an interest in the corporation.
15. GtEaN, RAioxAnA OF PnoxaamA CAUSE (1927).
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TAXATION-INcoME

TAXES-STOCKHOLDER-TRANSFEREE'S

LIABILITY

FOLLOWIi

Loss.-Petitioners were shareholders of a corporation which began a series of distributions in complete liquidation
in 1937 with the final distribution occurring in 1940. Petitioners reported the
profits obtained from this transaction, classifying them as capital gains, Prior
to final distribution in complete liquidation in 1940 a suit was commenced against
the corporation. The suit resulted in final judgment against the corporation in
1944, which the stockholders, as transferees of the corporation's assets, were required to and did pay. Classifying the loss as an ordinary business one, each took
a tax deduction for 100% of the amount paid. The Commissioner determined a
deficiency by asserting that the 1944 payment represented a capital loss. The Tax
Court held that it represented an ordinary loss. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reversed, treating the loss as "capital." On certiorari, to
the United States Supreme Court, held, three justices dissenting, judgment affirmed.
Since the petitioners' liability as transferees was not based on any ordinary
business transactions apart from the liquidation proceedings, the payments should
be capital losses. Arrowsmith et al. v. Commissioner, 73 Sup. Ct. 71 (1952).
Losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets are capital losses, and amounts
distributed in partial or complete liquidation of a corporation are treated as payments in exchange for the stock.2 When judgments or other claims become enforceable against an already dissolved corporation, the stockholder-transferees may
'then be held liable for these debts of the corporation to the extent of the
liquidating dividends paid to them.3 Where, as in the instant case, the stockholder pays as a transferee a subsequently determined liability of the dissolved
corporation, a problem, not specifically provided for by the Code, is presented
as to the tax treatment of this payment.
Prior to the decision in North American Oil v. Burnet,4 the Board of Tax Appeals held that the proper treatment of such stockholder-transferee payments
would be to consider them as reductions of the liquidating dividends received.0
The reopening of the transferee's tax return in which the liquidating dividend was
received was allowed in order to reduce the amount of the tax. The North American
case overruled the earlier decisions and held that income received "under a claim
of right and without restriction as to its disposition"0 is taxable in the year
of receipt and that if the taxpayer later repays part of that income he is entitled
to a deduction in the year of repayment rather than in the year of original receipt.1
The courts have subsequently upheld the "claim of right" doctrine as consistent
with the concept of the single year as the unit of taxation.8 Thus it seems quite
CORPORATE LIQUIDATION-CAPITAL Loss OR ORDiNARY

1.
2.

INT. REV. CODE §§ 23(g) and 117.
INT. RFv. CODE § 115(c).

3. Phillips-Jones Corp. et al. v. Parmley et al., 302 U.S. 233 (1937). See Comment,
19 FoPD. L. REv. 311 (1950). INT. REv. CODE § 311(a) provides the method by which
taxes imposed on a corporation may be collected from the transferee after dissolution.
4.

286 U.S. 417 (1932).

5. Benjamin Paschal O'Neal, 18 B.TA. 1036 (1930); E. M. F. Leflang, 6 B.T.A.
4 (1927); D. B. Barker, 3 B.TA. 1180 (1926).
6.

286 U.S. 417, 424 (1932).

7. "If in 1922 the Government had prevailed, and the Company had been obliged to
refund the profits received in 1917, it would have been entitled to a deduction from
the profits of 1922, not from those of any earlier year." Id. at 424.
8. John T. Furlong, 45 B.TA. 362 (1941); Roberta Pittman, 14 T.C. 449 (1950);
Commissioner v. Hartfield, 194 F. 2d 662 (2d Cir. 1952).
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clear that whatever the tax status of the subsequent loss, it should be accounted
for in the later taxable year when the obligation accrues or is paid.0
The question of the tax status of the subsequent loss is not as simple to determine
as is the taxable year of reporting. Under the accepted concept of the single year
as the unit of taxation, is the subsequent gain or loss a single transaction and, as
such, taxable as ordinary income or expense,' 0 or is it so tainted with capital
qualities as to have the same tax status as the original transaction from which it
resulted? In the recent case of Commissimer t. Suitlik"' stockholders of a
corporation received distributions in complete liquidation in 1941 and each reported his pro rata share in his income tax return for that year as a long-term
capital gain. In 1944, the stockholders paid their liability as transferees for
deficiencies in tax which the Commissioner, in 1942, determined the corporation
owed for the years of 1940 and 1941. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, affirming the Tax Court, held that the losses sustained by the stockholders
as a result of the payments made in 1944 were deductible in that year as ordinary
losses and not as capital losses. Basing its decision on the "single year" rule the
court considered the transferee's payment in 1944 as a separate and distinct
transaction from the liquidating distributions in 1941. Further, it held that the
payment of transferee liability in 1944, taken by itself, is neither a sale nor an
exchange of capital assets. 12 Thus under the Suitlik reasoning of strict interpretation
of Sections 23(g) and 117 of the Code, if the payment by the transferee does
not fall specifically within the statutory language of a "loss from the sale or exchange
of a capital asset," it is deductible as an ordinary loss. The Tax Court has since
3
adhered to this reasoning in a nearly unbroken line of decisions.'
14
related the
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the principal case
loss in 1944 resulting from the payment of the judgment by the transferees to
the liquidating dividend of 1940 and extended Sections 23(g) and 117 of the
Code to include losses "arising out of a 'sale or exchange.' ,Is The Supreme
Court, in affirming, held the losses to fall within the definition of "capital losses,"
without, however, interpreting the mentioned sections of the Code. It was also
asserted that the principle of each taxable year being a separate unit for tax
accounting purposes is not breached by examining the liquidation transaction
events in order "properly to classify" the subsequent loss 10
9. "Income taxes must be paid on income received (or accrued) during an annual
accounting period. . . . The 'daim of right' interpretation of the tax laws has long
been used to give finality to that period, and is now deeply rooted in the Federal
tax system." United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 592 (1951).
10. E.g., INT. REv. CODE § 23(e)(2).
11. 184 F. 2d 299 (3d Cir. 1950).
12. Id. at 302.
13. Frederick R. Bauer, 15 T.C. 876 (1950) (Instant case in Tax Court); Seth 'AT.
milliken, 15 T.C. 243 (1950); Frederick M. Paist, 10 T.C. Iem. 967 (19S1); Contra:
Duveen Brothers, Inc., 17 T.C. 124 (1951).
14. Commissioner v. Bauer, 193 F. 2d 734 (2d Cir.), aff'd sub nom, Arrosmith et aL
v. Commissioner, 73 Sup. Ct. 71 (1952).
15. Id. at 735.
16. Accord, Milliken v. Commissioner, 196 F. 2d 135 (2d Cir. 1952); Duveen Bros.
Inc. v. Commissioner, 197 F. 2d 118 (2d Cir. 1952). Where the value of the assets
acquired by a transferee was not immediately ascertainable at the time of liquidation,
income from such assets, received in a subsequent year was held to be capital gain.
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Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissent regarded the loss as an ordinary loss in accordance with the principle that each tax year must "stand on its own footing." In
the other dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Jackson, with whom Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred, expressed the view that where a statute is so indecisive, as in
the instant case, greater reliance and deference should be given to the Tax Court
decisions." 7
It appears that the decision in the instant case presents a more logical and
realistic result than the Switlik decision. The subsequent loss is not such a
separate and distinct transaction' from the liquidating dividend as to be rewarded
with the benefits of an ordinary loss. It does not thwart the single year rule merely
to examine, without- reopening, the prior transaction in order to determine the
nature of the subsequent payment. Moreover, the Switlik decision offers a potential
tax-minimization device whereby officer-stockholders may underestimate liabilities
to liquidation in order to gain the benefits,
(especially Federal income taxes) prior
8
as transferees, of an ordinary loss.'
Though the principle of looking to the nature of the original transaction to
determine the tax status of the subsequent transaction is more equitable than treating it as an independent transaction, it does present a hardship to the taxpayer who
19
Thus in the instant case, the payhas no capital gains in the years available.
have been fully deductible by the
would
probably
which
judgment,
the
ment of
corporation, becomes a capital loss of limited deductibility to the stockholdertransferees. The solution would appear to be that liquidators should leave sufficient
assets in the corporation at the time of liquidation in order to meet such foreseeable contingent liabilities.

TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-MEANING

OF "GUEST"

AS

USED

IN

GUEST

STATUTE-

Plaintiff, a minor and member of a boy scout troop of which the defendant was
the assistant scout master, was injured while engaged in a scrap paper collection
for the benefit of the troop, which was under the direct control and supervision
of the defendant. Plaintiff alleged that he was climbing aboard a utility trailer
attached to the defendant's automobile when the defendant increased the speed
of the auto and the plaintiff was thereby thrown underneath the wheels and suffered
severe injuries. Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings and the plaintiff's
opening statement. The trial court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals
Westover et at. v. Smith, 173 F. 2d 90 (9th Cir. 1949); Commissioner v. Carter, 170
F. 2d 911 (2d Cir. 1948).

17. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943). Speaking of the Tax Court, the
Court said at 498, 499: "It deals with a subject that is highly specialized and so complex
as to be. the despair of judges. It is relatively better staffed for its task than Is the
judiciary. . . . Tested by every theoretical and practical reason for administrative finality,
no administrative decisions are entitled to higher credit in the courts." But see INT.
REV. CODE § 1141(a).
18. However, the court intimated in the Switlik case that the result might have been
different if there had been any "untoward motivation" for the distributions in liquidation.
Commissioner v. Switlik, 184 F. 2d 299, 302 (3d Cir. 1950).

19. Capital losses are only deductible to the extent of capital gains plus net Income
up to $1000.0O.and may be carried forward for five years. INT. Rzv. COD §§ 117(d)(2)
and i17(e) (1).
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reversed and remanded the cause. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio,
three judges dissenting, held, affirmed. The plaintiff was not the guest of the
defendant under the Ohio guest statute and the defendant was therefore liable if
negligent. Vest v. Kramer, 158 Ohio St. 78, 107 N.E. 2d 105 (1952).
Under common law principles, the majority of jurisdictions requires a motorist
who carries another gratuitously to exercise ordinary care in the maintenance
and operation of his automobile.' A minority of states, by analogy to the bailee's
liability in gratuitous bailment cases, holds a host liable only for gross negligence.2
Other jurisdictions are those which have enacted so-called guest statutes which
predicate liability upon a finding of wilful, wanton or gross negligence.3 The
various guest statutes which have been passed are twofold in their purpose. Primarily
legislators have sought to eliminate the apparent injustice occasioned by holding
a motorist liable for injuries to his guest where there has not been commensurate
compensation for the transportation. 4 The minimizing of the advantages of the
opportunity for collusion between host and guest practiced on insurance companies
has been the secondary motivating factor5
The instant case was decided under the Ohio guest statute and has presented
to the court the problem of determining what factors tender a rider a guest within
the meaning of the statute. While each case must rest upon its own peculiar facts,0
certain tests have been applied in attempts to solve the problem. Courts have made
extensive use of the so-called benefit theory in which they seek to ascertain the
benefit of the trip and the recipient of such benefit. 7 The application of this
test has necessarily resulted in two main classifications of trips: those where tangible
benefit is conferred on the driver and those where insufficient or no tangible benefit
is conferred. Riders in the former class are generally said to be passengers while
those under the second classification are usually treated as guests.
A guest has been defined as anyone being transported without compensation. 8
1. This is the law in the heavily populated states of New York and Pennsylvania.
4 BLAsnrxLD, CY.oPs'DrA Or Aurro oBna LAw a-D PRAc.znc § 2321 (Perm. ed. 1946)
and cases cited therein; Comment, 35 MIcir. L. REv. 804 (1937).
2. 4 BLAmmHEL, CYcLoPED A or Aua'o=xBa Law am PRacecr
§ 2322 (Perm. ed.
1946) and cases therein cited.
3. Gammon, The Automobile Guest, 17 TFNm.L. REV. 452 (1943). Twenty-six states
have passed "guest statutes" which are substantially similar but can be grouped into
the following categories: a) Those states which have a provision similar to the Ohio
section under discussion wherein a guest is defined as one transported "without payment. '
This group includes-Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming. b) A second
group, whose legislative enactments use the words "without compensation" rather than
"without payment" indude-California, Iowa and South Dakota.
4. Duncan v. Hutchinson, 139 Ohio St. 185, 39 N.E. 2d 140 (1942).
5. Kitchens v. Duffield, 149 Ohio St. 500, 79 N.E. 2d 906 (1948); Pnossma, ToRts
634 (1941).
6. George v. Stanfield et al., 33 F. Supp. 486 (D. Idaho 1940).
7. Forsling v. Mickelson, 66 S.D. 366, 283 N.W. 169 (1938); 4 Br-%smr=rw, Ccr.oprnrA
or AuromoBnm LAw AND PRAcTIcE § 2292 (Perm. ed. 1946).
8. Crawford et al. v. Foster et a., 100 Cal. App. 81, 293 Pac. 841 (1930); 2 Rzsran-

iu=,

ToRTs § 490 (1934).
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In Ohio the statute specifies guests as persons who are transported without pay-

ment.9 The ordinary rules of negligence apply when there is a "bargained for"
transportation.' 0 Hence, when the driver is for "hire or reward," the rider is
correctly termed a "passenger." The compensation given need not be money
in order to exclude a rider from the guest classification nor must it necessarily
pass between the passenger and the driver."' Also, where one becomes a rider
12
for the purpose of being of service to the driver he is not deemed to be a guest.
When the rider is the sole beneficiary of the trip, merely contributing companion14
ship' 3 or is riding for his own pleasure upon the invitation of the driver, he
fals squarely within the language and intent of the statutes. Mere incidental benefit
5
accruing to the owner would not seem to destroy the status of guest.' Actual payride
has caused
the
the
one
accepting
by
sharing
thereof
ment of expenses or a
the courts to differ in resolving his status. In such a situation the trip could be
for the common benefit of both the rider and the driver and, hence, is not within
the previously mentioned main categories. A determination as to whether the
trip has a business or a social aspect has immeasurably helped in reconciling cases
which involve this particular point.' 6 Where there is a mutual business venture
of which the trip is an essential part, it has been held that the driver has received
17
sufficient material benefit as to render the status of the rider that of a passenger.
18
A contrary result is reached when the trip is of a social nature.
The principal case involves a charitable enterprise.' 0 The crucial question before
the court, in view of the foregoing discussion, was whether the actual or prospective
9. "The owner, operator or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle
shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or death of a guest while
being transported without payment therefor in or upon said motor vehicle, resulting from
the operation thereof, unless such injuries or death are caused by the wilful or wanton
misconduct of such operator, owner or person responsible for the operation of said motor
vehicle." 4A PAGE'S OHIo GENERAL CODE 6308-6 (Replacement 1945).
10. Ward v. George, 195 Ark. 216, 112 S.W. 2d 30 (1937); Crawford et al. v. Foster
et al., 100 Cal. App. 81, 293 Pac. 841 (1930).
11. See note 6 supra; McCann et al. v. Hoffman et al., 9 Cal. 2d 279, 70 P. 2d 909
(1937); McGuire v. Armstrong, 268 Mich. 152, 255 N.W. 745 (1934). In Jenkins v.
National Paint & Varnish Co., 17 Cal. App. 2d 161, 165, 61 P. 2d 780, 782 (1936), the
court defined compensation as "any return which may make it worth the operator's while
to furnish the ride."
12. An expectation of compensation has been held insufficient to prevent one from
being considered a guest within the statute. See note 6 supra and Voelkl v. Latin, 58
Ohio App. 245, 16 N.E.2d 519 (1938).
13. Holtsinger v. Scarbrough, 69 Ga. App. 117, 24 S. E. 2d 869 (1943).
14. Shiels v. Audette, 119 Conn: 75, 174 AtI. 323 (1934).
15. Drea v. Drea, 292 Mass. 477, 198 N.E. 743 (1935); Audia v. De Angells et al.,
121 Conn. 336, 185 Atl. 78 (1936).
16. See note 4 supra. Even in this situation the benefit test obtains. The benefit, of
which the driver must be the recipient in order to preclude him from the protection of
the statute must be a material and tangible one flowing from and depending on the transportation provided. McCann et al. v. Hoffman et al., 9 Cal. 2d 279, 70 P. 2d 909 (1937).
17. Wlhtechat v. Guyette, 19 Cal. 2d 428, 122 P. 2d 47 (1942) ; Note 26 CALIF. L. REV.
251 (1938).
18. Clodfelter v. Wells, 212 N.C. 823, 195 S.E. 11 (1938).

1953]

RECENT DECISIONS

benefit accruing to the driver was sufficiently tangible and material to be considered compensatory and thereby to take the plaintiff out of the guest status.
In sweeping triple hypotheses, the court sought to determine the relationship
of the plaintiff and defendant. Their relationship, reasoned the majority, was
either one in which: (a) the plaintiff was rendering services to the defendant;
(b) the plaintiff and defendant were mutually interested in the venture; (c) the
plaintiff and defendant were fellow workers. The majority of the court did
not clearly indicate what they considered was the true relationship but were stifed
in concluding that under each hypothesis, the plaintiff was not a guest.
Approaching the problem on a different, and, it is submitted, more positive
tack the dissenting opinion tests the case by the plain words of the Ohio statute.
Rather than speculating as to who is not a guest the dissent argues that one
transported "without payment therefor" is a guest and the burden of proving
The dissenting opinion
that he was not so transported is upon him who asserts it.
concludes that the failure of the plaintiff to sustain this burden precludes his
recovery.
The majority opinion is not without precedent. In Forsling v. MickeIsor,'
a business man transported a musician who volunteered his services in connection
with a community enterprise. The court rejected the defendant's plea that the
plaintiff was a guest. Similarly in Tzuentte v. Hart Motors22 where the plaintiff was
transported and injured while participating in a scrap drive, the court concluded
that no host-guest relationship existed. Between those cases and the instant case
no substantial distinctions appear. Nevertheless in each, it would appear, there
is an absence of anything resembling a tangible benefit accruing to the driver.P
These holdings when tested by the benefit theory appear to be at least doubtful
and their sanction by this court seems to compound the uncertainty as to what
constitutes payment - 4 under the statutes. Other decisions relied on by the
court are inapposite since they involve either situations where services are being
rendered to the driver2 or transportation given in the course of the driver's em26
ploymenL
19. This charitable enterprise is to be distinguished from a joint enterprise which necessarily involves an equal right of control. Bloom v. Leech, 120 Ohio St. 239, 165 N.E.
137 (1929); Note, 10 Cnz,. L. Rxv. 297 (1936).

20. Ames v. Siebert, 156 Ohio St. 45, 99 N.E.2d 905 (1951); Hasbrook v. Wingate,
152 Ohio St. 50, 87 N. E. 2d 87 (1949). It is a general rule that the party benefiting from

a statute has the burden of pleading and proving it but many states have held just the
contrary in the application of guest statutes. Green v. Grimes-Stassforth Stationary Co.,
39 Cal. App. 2d 52, 102 P. 2d 452 (1940); Indianapolis & G.R.T. Co. v. Foreman, 162
Ind. 85, 69 N.E. 669 (1904); Pilcher v. Erny, 155 Ran. 257, 124 P. 2d 461 (1942); Goldberg v. Friedrich, 279 Pa. 572, 124 At. 186 (1924).
21. 66 S.D. 366, 283 N.W. 169 (1938).
22.

234 Iowa 1294, 15 N.W.2d 622 (1944).

23. It is not sufficient that it is contemplated that some indirect benefit, e.g.,
duction of expenses resulting from the sharing thereof will accrue to the driver.
v. Latin, 58 Ohio App. 245, 16 N.E.2d 519 (1938).
24. A recent federal case suggests the test of payment to be whether or not the
could maintain an action at law for the reasonable or agreed value of the given
portation. Pheiffer v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. et al., 186 F. 2d 558 (6th Cir. 191).
25. Dom v. North Olmstead, 133 Ohio St. 37S, 14 N.E.2d 11 (1938).
26. Dobbs v. Sugioka, 117 Colo. 218, 185 P. 2d 784 (1947); Hansen v. Nelson

a reVoelkI
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transet al.,
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On the other hand the result reached by the dissenting opinion seems in harmony
with well considered authority. 27 It had formerly been held in Ohio that where
there is no business connection and no transfer of benefit, mutual or otherwise,
but rather a mere common interest the rider is a guest as a matter of law. 2 8 In
les v. Lamphere29 an officer of a ladies' aid society was injured due to the negligent
driving of a fellow member while both were engaged in the furtherance of a food
sale by the society. The court held that the rider was a guest since no tangible
benefit accrued to the driver. Similarly in Henry et ux. v. Henson et ux.30 coworkers in a missionary society travelling to a convention were held to be host
and guest. The court concluded that the advancement of the Christian religion
was not a benefit of such a nature as to remove the passengers from that relation.
The instant decision, though presenting a situation seemingly identical with those
cases, appears to present a conflict.
The present decision appears to constitute a correct implementation by the
judiciary of the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. The benefit, if
any, accruing to the defendant in a situation such as presented by the principal
case is of a most intangible nature. If such a benefit be "payment" then the statute
would seem to have failed to achieve its purpose.

TORTS-NEGLIGENCE--STATUTE

OF LIMITATIONS-TIME

OF SALE

OF DEFECTIvE

GOODS DETERMINES RIGHT OF AcTION.-Plaintiff, a resident of Pennsylvania, brought
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut by reason
of diversity of citizenship charging defendant company, a Connecticut corporation,
with negligence in the manufacture of a rifle. Defendant manufacturer had shipped
the article on May 26, 1946, to a retailer. A cousin of the plaintiff purchased the
rifle on July 8, 1949. The rifle was loaned to the plaintiff on July 3, 1950, and on
the same day, while firing at a mark, the plaintiff lost his left eye when the rifle
backfired due to alleged faulty construction. The defendant pleaded the Connecticut
one year statute of limitations and moved for summary judgment. The motion
was granted. Upon appeal, one judge dissenting, held, affirmed. The plaintiff's
action was barred notwithstanding the commencement of the action within one
year of the date of the injury to the plaintiff since the act or omission of the
defendant complained of occurred more than one year prior to the action. Dincher
v. The Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F. 2d 821 (2d Cir. 1952).
It is fundamental to the law of negligence that no actionable wrong exists until
there has been an actual loss or damage to the' plaintiff.1 The pertinent Connecticut statute of limitations provides in part:' ". . . No action to recover damages
for injury to the person or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, . . .
shall be brought but within one year from the date of the act or omission com240 Iowa 1298, 39 N.W. 2d 292 (1949); Howes v. Kelman, 326 Mass. 696, 96 N.E.2d
394 (1951).
27. Ames v. Siebert, 156 Ohio St. 45, 99 N. E. 2d 905 (1951) ; Hasbrook v. W.lngate, 152
Ohio St. 50, 87 N.E. 2d 87 (1949).
28. Snyder v. Milligan, 52 Ohio App. 185, 3 N.E. 2d 633 (1936).
29. 60 Ohio App. 4, 18 N.E. 2d 989 (1938).
30.

174 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1943).

1. Commercial Bank v. Ten Eyck, 48 N.Y. 305 (1872); PROssER, TORTS § 30 (1941).
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plained of, . . .*2 In a leading New York case, Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch
Transportation Co., the court in applying the New York statute 4 pointed out that
not until there was actual injury to the person or property of the plaintiff arising
from the defendant's negligent act did the plaintiff have a personal right protected
by law. Logic and precedent compelled the court further to hold that until such
right accrued the statute could not begin to run against it. The United States
Supreme Court has had occasion to pass on the subject in Uric v. Thompson.5
There the Court held that a plaintiff was not barred by a three year statute of
limitations 6 because of the fact that he had been exposed to, but not injured by,
silica dust more than three years prior to commencement of the action. The Court
noted, "We do not think the humane legislative plan intended such consequences
to attach to blameless ignorance. Nor do we think those consequences can be
reconciled with the traditional purposes of statutes of limitations." 7 Heretofore the
Connecticut decisions have regarded the function and purpose of a statute of limitations as a bar to rights of action after accrual. Thus in the early case of Banh of
Hartford County v. Watermans the defendant pleaded the statute of limitations0
claiming that the neglect or breach of duty is the gist of the action and the statute
begins to run from the time of such neglect or breach. The court rejected this
argument and reasoned that where the act is not legally injurious until certion
consequences occur, the statute can only be said to run from the date of the consequential injury.
Clearly under the former wording of the instant statute where the limiting period
commenced from "the date of the injury or neglect complained of"10 the plaintiff
could have recovered. In .Kitchner v. Williams"- plaintiff sued for negligence in
the installation of a water heater. The action was brought more than two years
after installation, but within two years of an explosion allegedly resulting therefrom. Defendant pleaded a two year statute which ran from the time the cause
of action accrued. The court refused to bar the plaintiff's action on the sole ground
that had the plaintiff brought the action anytime before the explosion it would have
to be dismissed for up to that time he had suffered no damage. In dicta the court
noted that the result would have been otherwise were the plaintiff arguing that he
was unaware of the damage. In White v. Schnoebelcn 2 the action was for the
negligent installation of lightning rod equipment. The court refused to compute
the running of the limiting statute from the date of installation. It was stated that
it would be incomprehensible to attribute to the legislature the intent to have the
CoNe. Gmr. STAT. § 8324 (Revision 1949). See footnote 16 infra.
3. 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936).
4. "The following actions must be commenced within three years after the cause of
action has accrued: . . .(6) An action to recover damages for . . . a personal injury, resulting from negligence." N.Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr § 49.
5. 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
6. "No action shall be maintained . . . unless commenced within three years from
the day the cause of action accrued?' 53 STAT. 1404, 45 U.S.C.A. § 56 (1948).
7. 337 U.S. 163, 170"(1949).
8. 26 Conn. 323 (1857).
9. "No suit or action . . . shall be brought . . . but within two years next after the
right of action shall accrue?' 26 Conn. 323, 339 (1857).
10. Cosnr. Gm;. STAT. § 6015 (1930).
11. 171 Kan. 540, 236 P.2d 64 (1951).
12. 91 N.H. 273, 18 A.2d 185 (1941).
2.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 22

plaintiff's right of action barred before the cause even accrued. In Di Gironino
et al. v. American Seed Co. 13 the defendant sold an air rifle to a minor who permitted a third boy to fire it. The plaintiff was thereby injured and brought suit
for negligence in the sale of a rifle to a minor. The defendant argued that the
statute began to run from the time of the sale. The court rejected this reasoning
and held that the statute could not run until the cause of action accrued. The interof proximate cause, could not affect the
vening time, while relevant on the question
14
plaintiff's right to bring the action.
The majority of the court in the instant case, however, reasoned that the change
in the language of the statute from "the date of the injury or neglect complained
of" to "act or omission complained of" compelled them to uphold the defendant's
plea. The legislative intent, argued the court, was to have the statute run from the
0
date of the sale. Kenn.dy v. Johns-Manville Corp.,' cited by the majority as precedent for its decision, seems, as the dissenting opinion points out, to be inapposite.
There the plaintiff sued for negligent insulation of his home. The statute had
apparently run, but the plaintiff insisted that he had not been aware of the damage
and that therefore the action was brought in time. The court saw no force in the
argument and held quite properly that the statute had run against plaintiff's cause
0
of action despite his lack of knowledge as to its existence.' The principal case is
readily distinguishable from the instant case in that in the Kennedy case the negligence and injury were simultaneous. Even though the plaintiff was unaware of the
injury, it was inflicted at once. Here the plaintiff sues not for damage to the gun,
but to his eye, which did not occur until a date within the period of limitation.
The majority opinion is based upon the express language of the statute which
substituted "act or omission" for "injury or neglect" as the date for the commencement of the period of limitation. Against this argument the dissent maintains, and
it is submitted correctly, that the terms "injury or neglect" and "act or omission"
are often synonymous17 and the amendment was merely indicative of an attempt at
statutory uniformity.
It is apparent that the result of the instant case is anomalous. A statute of
13. 96 F. Supp. 795 (D.Pa. 1951). The pertinent statute read in part '.. , from the
time when the injury was done. . .

."

12 PA. STAT. 34 (Purdon 1895).

14. Id. at 797. "If as defendant suggests, the intervening time until the injury had
been a matter of many years rather than, as here, a matter of a few months that fact
would bear not upon the problem of limitations but upon the problem of proximate
cause."
15. 135 Conn. 176, 62 A. 2d 771 (1948).
16. The majority of the court also cites Giambozi v. Peters, 127 Conn. 380, 16 A. 2d
833 (1940) which decidedly is not in point. There a malpractice suit was brought under
a special section requiring action to commence within "two years from the date of the
accrual." The issue was whether the cause accrued when the defendant negligently transfused syphiletic blood into the plaintiff's testator or when treatment was completed. The
court held that the injury occurred with the transfusion and therefore the action was
not timely brought.
17. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8316 read from 1930- 1935: "No action upon a tort shall be
brought but within six years next after the right of action shall accrue." In 1935 the
legislature changed the terms of the statute to read "from the date of the act or omission complained of." This, the dissent argues, renders the change in the instant statute
insignificant since Section 8316 is the catch-all section in the limitation of tort actions.
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limitations, remedial in nature, has operated on the remedy before the maturity of
the right. It has ever been the purpose of a procedural 18 statute of limitations to
penalize the plaintiff for his laches after his cause accrued. In this, the courts of
Connecticut have concurred. 19 There is no reason to ascribe to that legislature a
contrary intent unless it is clearly required by the language employed. If the Connecticut courts choose to approve of the construction of the statute given in the
instant case, then the legislature should move swiftly to avoid, in the future, such
an apparently inequitable result.
18. A procedural statute of limitations, one barring the remedy, must be distinguished
from a substantive statute, one extinguishing the right. For a comprehensive discusion
of this problem see GOODRICH, CoNr-cr or LLws 240 (3d ed. 1949).
19. Consolidated Motor Lines Inc. v. M. & M. Transportation Co., 128 Conn. 107, 103,
20 A. 2d 621, 622 (1941).

